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HISTORIES OF CANADA’S FORMIDABLE ACHIEVEMENT in agricultural
science and crop breeding have usually been cast in the heroic vein, their subject
interpreted as a series of episodes in the progressive and benign advance of a rational
understanding and control of nature. This scientific story has dovetailed neatly with
accounts of Canada’s agricultural history that stress the modernization of farming or
that emphasize the concomitant themes of efficiency and productivity growth.
Because the development of prairie grains, rust-resistant wheats and canola take pride
of place in most accounts of agricultural science in Canada, those histories have
focused on events played out mainly in central Canada and the west. Nevertheless,
region and regional influences seldom play a central role in these accounts – a tacit
tribute to faith in the universality (or at least the internationalism) of natural science,
its methods and the advancing front of rational technological control spun off by that
science.
This paper explores a less-examined front in the history of Canadian agricultural
science. It reviews the important scientific research on the potato and potato
agriculture conducted at the federal Dominion Experimental Station (now the
Canadian Potato Research Centre) in Fredericton, New Brunswick, from the station’s
founding in 1912 through to the mid-1960s. Already by the end of this period, the
station ranked among the top five or six potato research institutes in the world, and it
could point to important achievements in potato virus research, entomological work,
theoretical and quantitative genetics, and basic agronomic techniques. Our focus,
however, is on the station’s efforts, initiated formally in 1934, to breed new varieties
of potatoes. That development agenda originally focussed on the quest for disease
resistance, but these objectives were expanded significantly in the 1950s and early
1960s to include commercial, agronomic and industrial considerations largely absent
from earlier work. By 1982, 11 of the 59 cultivars registered in Canada had been
developed in Fredericton, and a recently released variety, the Shepody, was soon to
go on to vast commercial success.
Rather than offer an heroic interpretation of these signal achievements, however,
this paper suggests that the broadening of the station’s breeding programme in the
1950s represented a partial retreat from the original objectives of the disease-
resistance breeding programme introduced in 1934, a concession to the fact that those
objectives could not be achieved as originally envisioned. It examines how research
agendas were related to the structural transformation of potato agriculture in New
Brunswick during the key decades of the 1950s and 1960s and it argues that the
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limitations of resistance breeding accelerated the shift of focus toward pesticides and
government-enforced phytosanitary systems.
This story demonstrates how science contributed to the structural transformation of
the potato industry in the region and also, conversely, how social, political and
economic forces helped to reshape research agendas and scientific expectations. This
story can be understood at two levels. First, the style of potato science in Fredericton
evolved over time and mirrored changing cultural ideals about science and
agriculture. Potato science was shaped by institutional responsibilities and
organizational forms, and by competing ideals, bureaucratic alignments and forms of
professional consciousness among scientists. Second, and on a broader scale, the
station’s breeding programme responded to the changing political economy of New
Brunswick’s agricultural sector, especially in the 1950s and 1960s.
These considerations pose significant questions about the supposed universality of
scientific and technological change and its relationship to region and regionality. By
the 1950s the potato-breeding programme at the Dominion Experimental Station in
Fredericton had achieved national, not just local or regional status. Its scientists
interacted regularly with researchers around the world, and provincial developments
in potato agriculture and in agricultural science reflected similar changes occurring all
over Europe and North America. But for all that, the particular dynamic of scientific
change at work at the Fredericton station is explicable only within the context of New
Brunswick and the region of which it is a part.
The Experimental Farm System
From its creation by Parliament in 1886 until more than two decades later in 1907,
the Experimental Farms Branch of the Canadian federal Department of Agriculture
consisted of the Central Experimental Farm outside Ottawa, the branch’s five
divisions (all headquartered on the central farm) and its four branch farms in Nova
Scotia, Manitoba, the North-West Territories and British Columbia. Beginning in
1907, however, the number of experimental stations (only the original five were
officially designated farms) began to multiply rapidly, partly due to the efforts of the
redoubtable William Saunders, first director of the branch.1 Not all the new
installations, however, were stations. The Division of Entomology and the Division of
Botany and Plant Pathology of the Experimental Farms Branch also opened
laboratories across the country, not all of which were connected with, or located on,
a farm or station. By 1913, two years following Saunders’ retirement in 1911, the
Experimental Farms Branch had grown to ten divisions (all in Ottawa), eighteen farms
1 The official history is T.H. Anstey, One Hundred Harvests. Research Branch Agriculture Canada
1886-1986, Research Branch, Agriculture Canada, Historical Series no. 27 (Ottawa, 1986). Available
online at http://collection.ic.gc.ca/agrican/pubweb/titles_e.asp. In addition to the sources listed in the
notes, we are grateful to a number of former station scientists and agricultural officials who agreed to
be interviewed. We thank the various members of the administration of the Potato Research Centre,
and especially PRC Librarian Richard Anderson, for their cooperation with this project. We are
grateful to the archivists at the New Brunswick Provincial Archives (PANB) and the National
Archives of Canada (NA) for advice and assistance. This study was funded by Social Sciences and
Humanities Research Council of Canada.
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or stations (including the central farm) and nine entomology or plant pathology
laboratories.2
During these decades the organization of federal agricultural research underwent
significant changes. In 1914 the Entomological Division of the Experimental Farms
Branch was reconstituted as an autonomous branch, and its new director, Dominion
Entomologist C.G. Hewitt, embarked on an ambitious programme to expand the
entomological laboratory facilities in Ottawa and across the country. In 1937 a more
significant reorganization saw the Department of Agriculture reconstituted into four
functional “Services”: Production Services, Marketing Services, Experimental Farms
Services and the Science Service. The new Science Service combined the former
Entomological Branch with three divisions of the old Experimental Farms Branch. Its
creation marked a victory for elements within the department urging a division that
would be explicitly “scientific” and “research-oriented” and served to hold at bay the
ambitions of the National Research Council, which, as Stéphane Castonguay has
argued, was eager to carve out its own slice of the agricultural research pie.3
For all its initial success, William Saunders’ creation wrestled from its inception
with persistent organizational and conceptual tensions. One was the struggle of the
regional farms and stations for operating autonomy versus the instinct of Saunders
and his successors to centralize operating control and most advanced research on the
central farm and its divisions in Ottawa. Another was the balance to be struck between
research per se and what would later be called extension services – the responsibility
of the stations to assist and instruct the farmers whom the experimental farm system
regarded as its natural clients. Perhaps most important was the proper trade-off
between a practical, utilitarian and theory-free approach to agricultural science and
more academic, theoretical and discipline-based visions. The divisional structure that
William Saunders imposed upon his experimental farm system in 1886 – field crops
and husbandry, cereals, chemistry, entomology and botany and horticulture –
reflected the tense compromise between an agricultural science modelled upon the
scientific disciplines and one modelled upon the practical and economic concerns of
the farm enterprise itself. That tension was to surface again in 1937, when the newly
created Science Service moved to restructure agricultural research in Canada much
more directly along the compartmentalized lines of the scientific disciplines.
Agronomic Science in Fredericton: The Early Decades
Since at least the 1850s, improving farmers and enlightened elites in New
Brunswick, modestly assisted financially by their provincial governments, had tried to
promote the practical improvement of agriculture through grants to local agricultural
societies, sponsorship of provincial exhibitions and the founding of province-wide
umbrella organizations. The New Brunswick provincial government set up its
Department of Agriculture in 1888, but it grew slowly, with 7 employees in 1910 and
2 Anstey, One Hundred Harvests, pp. 33-8.
3 Anstey, One Hundred Harvests, pp. 49-65; Robert Glen, “Organization of the Research Branch of the
Canada Department of Agriculture, an Historical Review”, Agricultural Institute Review, 17 (1962),
pp. 18-20, 45-6; Stéphane Castonguay, “Fédéralisme et centralisation de la recherche agricole au
Canada: dynamique scientifique et compétition institutionelle”, Bulletin d’histoire poltique 7, 3
(1999), pp. 21-39.
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21 by 1918. The new department encouraged progressive agriculture, assisted
immigration from abroad onto New Brunswick farms, superintended butter and
cheese manufactures and promoted agricultural schools.4
Although these activities were often described as promoting “scientific”
agriculture, research per se emerged exclusively as a federal, not a provincial, area of
competence, and provision for actual investigations in New Brunswick had to await
the expansion of the experimental farm system. A small General Entomological
Laboratory was established in Fredericton on the University of New Brunswick
campus in 1911 by the Entomological Division of the Experimental Farms Branch
(soon to become an autonomous branch). In 1915 the Division of Botany and Plant
Pathology organized a laboratory on the second floor of the old Fredericton post
office. The big prize, however, was an experimental station. After sufficient local
pressure had been applied to Ottawa, a site was chosen on the south side of the St.
John River, three miles below the centre of the city and still within the municipal
boundaries. Four hundred and fifty acres were purchased in September 1912, and
subsequent expansions brought the station to 764 acres by 1960.5 The Fredericton
station eventually came to house the two laboratories even though, before 1959, they
were administratively independent and did not report to the station superintendents.6
The types of agronomic investigations performed at the Fredericton station during
its early decades, as well as the rhetoric employed by station superintendents in the
annual reports, bring readily to mind the “Baconian” style of science described as
characteristic of the Victorian period in North America.7 Experimental work on potato
4 Lorna Williams, “From Agricultural Improvement to Industrial Affirmation: The Evolution of the
New Brunswick Provincial Exhibitions, 1852-1883”, M.A. thesis, University of New Brunswick,
2003; J.D. White, “Speed the Plow: Agricultural Societies in Pre-Confederation New Brunswick”,
M.A. thesis, University of New Brunswick, 1977; E.B. DeMerchant, From Humble Beginnings. The
Story of Agriculture in New Brunswick (Fredericton, 1983), pp. 39-63. For a Nova Scotia comparison,
see Richard A. Jarrell, “Science and Public Policy in Nineteenth-Century Canada: Nova Scotia
Promotes Agriculture”, in Paul A. Bogaard, ed., Profiles of Science and Society in the Maritimes prior
to 1914 (Fredericton, 1990), pp. 221-42.
5 The most comprehensive history of the Fredericton station is a 66-page undated ms at the library of
the Fredericton Potato Research Centre: R.G. White, “History of the Fredericton Experimental
Station/Research Station, 1912-1970” (n.d.). Other historical sketches include Canada Agriculture
Research Station Fredericton N.B. (Ottawa, 1961), 12 pp. and Rodrigue Hurtubise, “History of the
Fredericton Research Station 1912-1986” (12 p. 1985 ms at Potato Research Centre library,
Fredericton). D.A. Young et al., Fredericton Research Station 1912-1987, Research Branch,
Agriculture Canada, Historical Series no. 35 (1987) is a useful account of research pursued at the
station in various fields and available online at http://collections.ic.gc.ca/agrican/pubweb/titles_e.asp.
On the experimental farm at Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island (founded in 1909), see Mary B.
Bourdon, Charlottetown Research Station 1909-1984, Research Branch, Agriculture Canada,
Historical Series no. 19 (1984).
6 In 1925 the Plant Pathology Laboratory was moved to the grounds of the Fredericton station, and in
1938 a new laboratory building with attached greenhouse was erected for its use. The original
agricultural entomology laboratory spun off several units. Entomological control studies were done at
the general Entomological Laboratory (which successively occupied various sites on the UNB
campus), but virus vector research, which began around 1940, was housed in the Laboratory of Plant
Pathology (since 1925 on the grounds of the Fredericton station) and from 1950 in facilities of its
own.
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agronomy, for example, was presented as a diverse series of mostly theory-free
optimization experiments carried out on many factors related to potato cultivation.
Fredericton agronomists investigated optimum row spacing, plant separation, manure
and fertilizer applications, and cultivation frequency. They systematically compared
immature versus mature potatoes as seed, large versus small seed pieces, long versus
round and sprouted versus unsprouted tubers for producing early crops; they also
compared the benefits of spraying versus dusting for fungus. The style of early station
research also mirrored the older tradition of what Suzanne Zeller has called
“inventory” science, as variety screening for yield was the major focus of
experimental work.8 In the first decade, station agronomists inventoried hundreds of
different potato varieties, an important service given the relatively unregulated use of
variety names at the time. Theory- or laboratory-based investigation was little in
evidence among Fredericton station agronomists, although it played a larger role in
the work of plant pathologists and entomologists in the sister services.
During this period, agronomists published their experimental results almost
exclusively in Agriculture Canada reports and bulletins aimed at provincial farmers
and at other farms and stations; agronomists performed their investigations and
presented the results in a manner readily accessible to improving farmers.
Experimental methods were straightforward and statistical analyses elementary.
Confidence-interval and significance statistics did not make their appearance until the
late 1930s, with the first regression analyses coming much later. This was a
“democratic” style of science that minimized the distance between scientist and
farmer and served the double function of better assisting farmers and averting the
ever-present danger that the station’s work might be seen by its clients as impractical,
highfaluting or tending to the ivory tower. The Maritime Farmer and Co-operative
Dairyman, the region’s major agricultural newspaper, echoed this democratic ideal
approvingly in its consistent support for the station and its work. All farmers do
experiments constantly on new varieties and practices, the paper claimed on several
occasions, but because such experimentation is time-consuming and expensive, that
work could be more efficiently carried out on the farmers’ behalf by the Dominion
Experimental Station in Fredericton.9 Thus efficiency and convenience, not any
particular form of scientific or agricultural expertise possessed by station agronomists,
was what justified the station’s existence. This popular interpretation, encouraged by
the station’s own style and rhetoric, echoed a very old faith in science as universal
commonsense and rationality, codified and reduced to method.
The early mandate of the Experimental Farms Branch imposed responsibility for
7 Suzanne Zeller, Land of Promise, Promised Land: The Culture of Victorian Science in Canada,
Canadian Historical Association Historical Booklet no. 56 (Ottawa, 1996), pp. 1-21; Suzanne Zeller,
Inventing Canada: Early Victorian Science and the Idea of a Transcontinental Nation (Toronto,
1987), esp. pp. 4-5; Carl Berger, Science, God, and Nature in Victorian Canada: The 1982 Joanne
Goodman Lectures (Toronto, 1983), esp. pp. 3-27, 31-50; Trevor H. Levere and Richard A. Jarrell,
eds., A Curious Field-book: Science and Society in Canadian History (Toronto, 1974), esp. p. 1-24;
Bogaard,  Profiles of Science and Society in the Maritimes; Alan I. Marcus, Agricultural Science and
the Quest for Legitimacy: Farmers, Agricultural Colleges, and Experimental Stations, 1870-1890
(Ames, Iowa, 1985).
8 Zeller, Inventing Canada, pp. 4-5.
9 Maritime Farmer and Cooperative Dairyman, 11 September 1917, p. 566; 20 July 1946, p. 6.
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extension as well as research functions, and this responsibility had implications for the
science that was conducted in Fredericton. Just as most New Brunswick farms
pursued mixed farming with limited specialization, the station personnel studied and
maintained on display all elements of the particular mix of agricultural activities being
pursued in the province. As part of its investigative activities, the station periodically
reported the input-factor costs in producing an acre of potatoes on the station, and
compared them with the yield, market price and the resulting per-acre profit from the
crop. The exercise served the extension function by providing farmers with a practical
yardstick by which they could assess their own management performance.
The Dominion Experimental Station in Fredericton also served its extension
mandate by providing models for farmers’ assessment and emulation. Earlier calls to
set up a model farm to inspire and instruct New Brunswick farmers had come to
nothing, but in 1916 the new federal installation initiated a series of illustration
stations around the province, and the staff regularly provided direct instruction and
advice to farmers at field days, agricultural association meetings and by
correspondence. The Fredericton station also made itself the focus of agricultural life
in New Brunswick. The station’s first Open House, held in 1916, drew 1,200 farmers
and their families from around the province; the second drew 3,000 and, before
wartime cutbacks in the 1940s, the “At-Homes” had expanded to three-day events.
These affairs combined the promulgation of information about progressive farming
with rhetorical celebrations of rural life and farming ideology, and featured guided
tours of the Fredericton station’s facilities, opportunities for consultation with station
personnel, speeches by local and visiting scientists and politicians and dinners served
up by the Fredericton Women’s Institute.10 In conformity to an agenda set by William
Saunders himself, the Fredericton station, like the Central Farm, invested heavily in
flowers, hedges and ornamentals, not only so that its grounds would attract visitors
and picnickers, but also (as the Maritime Farmer noted in 1934) so that visitors would
be inspired to emulate the farm practices they observed.11
Outreach to the farm community in these respects came easy to the Fredericton
station because during its early years it was in some respects like a New Brunswick
farm. The superintendent lived on the station, where he entertained visiting dignitaries
(a new house was built for the superintendent in 1926). Some other employees, from
labourers to scientists, rented houses on the station grounds, and employees could be
supplied (at a charge) with vegetables, eggs and sometimes meat. Crops and animals
produced on the farm were sold, providing a return to the Receiver General equivalent
(in the early 1940s) to almost a fifth of the station’s budgetary appropriation.
Local and regional identification also seems to have been strong among station
personnel, even though Ottawa insisted on minute control over their activities and
expenditures. The station’s first director, New Brunswicker W.W. Hubbard, resigned
in 1921 over what he regarded as heavy-handed Ottawa bureaucrats who were
indifferent to Maritime interests, although he judged that at the Fredericton station
10 Maritime Farmer and Cooperative Dairyman, 11 September 1917, p. 566; 5 September 1922, p. 371.
11 Julie Harris and Jennifer Mueller, “Making Science Beautiful: The Central Experimental Farm, 1886-
1939”, Ontario History, 84, 2 (June, 1997), pp. 103-23; Maritime Farmer and Cooperative
Dairyman, 5 June 1934, p. 8.
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“the officials seem to be N.B. minded”.12 The energetic Gilbert C. Cunningham began
his career in the federal service as head of the Plant Pathology Laboratory in
Fredericton. But he rapidly became the indefatigable champion of the New Brunswick
potato industry and moved on to the provincial civil service as the first director of the
provincial government’s Potato Production and Marketing Service. In all respects, the
image of scientific expertise that the Fredericton station presented dovetailed with its
conception of its public responsibility and extension function and continued to reflect
ideals of agricultural science laid down in the Victorian era.
The Potato-Breeding Programme
In 1934 the research agenda of the Fredericton station was broadened in a way that
moved the style of agricultural science practised there in new directions. Although the
station had screened potato varieties and investigated cultivation and management
practices very intensely since 1912, potato breeding and variety development had
never been performed systematically in Fredericton or elsewhere in Canada. In 1934,
however, the Dominion Department of Agriculture initiated a major program of
variety development in Fredericton. Louis C. Young, station horticulturalist, and D.J.
MacLeod, Officer-in-Charge of the Dominion Pathological Laboratory, were sent to
tour American facilities. Their report lauded the benefits of scientific specialization
and argued that “the weight of evidence obtained . . . [favours] searching for disease
resistance rather than other attributes in all primary selections”. This recommendation
that disease resistance rather than improved agronomic characteristics should be the
primary focus of the breeding program continued to guide variety-development work
at Fredericton for the next two decades.13 Between 1933 and 1946, Fredericton
agronomists produced some 150,000 seedlings from hybrid crosses and screened them
for disease resistance and acceptable commercial properties. Approximately half the
seedlings studied were bred for resistance to late blight disease and its causal fungus
Phytophthora infestans, using the wild Mexican potato species Solanum demissum as
a source of resistant germ plasm. The resistance programme expanded to include
mosaic disease (1934), common scab (1936) and leaf roll disease (1937).14
Ottawa’s consent to a major programme of variety development was probably
motivated in part by the fact that the United States had initiated its own National
Potato Breeding Program in 1929. Its decision to locate the programme in Fredericton
owed much to the initiative of local scientists, but it was also influenced by the fact
that New Brunswick potato production, while still small in comparison to that of
12 H.H. Hubbard, “Life and Times in New Brunswick, 1866-1945”, MC16/MS1, PANB, p. 3.
13 D.J. MacLeod and L.C. Young, “Report of Trip to Institutions in the United States in Connection with
Co-operative Potato Breeding Project”, (57-page 1934 ms at Potato Research Centre library,
Fredericton).
14 Experimental Station Fredericton, N.B., Report of the Superintendent . . . [later title variations: Results
of Experiments, Progress Report, Research Report] (Ottawa), annually 1921-1930, 1937 [covering
1931-36], 1948 [covering 1937-47], 1953 [covering 1948-52], 1958 [covering 1953- 57], 1962
[covering 1958-60], 1963 [covering 1961-62], 1965 [covering 1963-64] and 1967 [covering 1965-
66]. We are indebted to Eric Davies for access to unpublished materials held by him under the title
“Seminars, Press Articles, and Talks Given by H.T. Davies 1950-1978” and referenced here as
“Davies Papers”.
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Ontario and Quebec, was the largest in the three Maritime Provinces and increasing.15
More interesting is the federal Department of Agriculture’s decision to focus the
breeding programme on the development of disease-resistant varieties, with less
concern for improving agronomic properties such as size, yield, taste, dry-matter
content, hardiness or storage capacity. In this decision the department was surely led
by the expectation that potato research would emulate the major advances then being
made in creating rust-resistant varieties of prairie grains. But the explanation also lies
in the nature of the potato itself.
Cultivated potatoes are more susceptible to fungal, viral and bacterial pathogens
than any other major crop. One reason for this is their narrow genetic base: almost all
cultivated potatoes are varieties of a single subspecies, Solanum tuberosum, that was
introduced into Europe from South America in the early modern period and
subsequently isolated from the sources of new germ plasm present in the many wild
species and primitive cultivated varieties that exist in South and Central America.
Potatoes’ vulnerability to disease also follows from the fact that they are propagated
almost exclusively by vegetative means, from “seed tubers” or seed tuber-pieces held
over from the previous year’s crop, not from “true” or “botanical” seed formed in a
berry after pollination. While relatively few diseases can be transmitted from one
plant generation to the next through botanical seed, many are readily transmitted
through seed tubers, with viral diseases being particularly insidious in this regard.16
Concern about potato disease was on the increase among growers in Eastern
Canada after 1915, partly because potato diseases seemed to be becoming actually
more prevalent and partly because of improved scientific and bureaucratic potential
for detecting and publicizing them. In normal years the fungal disease late blight, the
most feared of all potato diseases, could be controlled by the ubiquitous Bordeaux
mixture fungicide, but thousands of smaller farmers in New Brunswick lacked the
spraying and dusting equipment required or could not afford the chemical. In extreme
blight years (1927, 1928, 1932, 1936) the fungicide provided little protection anyway;
in 1926 potatoes at the Fredericton station were so badly blighted that the entire crop
had to be destroyed, curtailing or eliminating potato investigations at the station for
several years. The virus-induced “mild mosaic” disease, of great concern in the 1920s,
did decline in importance after 1930, but it was replaced by what appears to have been
an increasing incidence of other diseases, including common scab, bacterial ring rot
and the viral disease leaf roll. So rampant were viral diseases among the potato stocks
at the Fredericton station  in 1943 that breeders were obliged to transfer the field-
based elements of their programme to an isolation station, a practice increasingly
common among potato-breeding programmes around the world. The New Brunswick
site chosen was in Albert County, relatively free from aphid-vectors and located at a
distance from other potato farms. What toll disease took among private producers is
harder to determine, but market data that show 1920 to 1935 as a period of wildly
15 Potato Historical Series. Statistics Canada, Agricultural Division, Crops Section (Ottawa, November
1992). In 1934, total Canadian production was 2,181,600 tonnes, with PEI producing 218,800, Nova
Scotia 111,300 and New Brunswick 314,700 tonnes. New Brunswick production did not regularly
surpass that of Ontario or Quebec until the late 1950s.
16 Hans Ross, Potato Breeding – Problems and Prospects (Berlin and Hamburg, 1986); J.G. Hawkes,
The Potato. Evolution, Biodiversity and Genetic Resources (London, 1990).
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fluctuating prices, production levels and yields per acre suggest significant disease
problems.17
The new disease consciousness that motivated the breeding programme in
Fredericton also owed its origins to the growing economic importance of potato
exports, especially of seed potatoes, from New Brunswick and Prince Edward
Island.18 That gave disease-consciousness a political face. In 1909 the fungal disease
“wart”, unknown in North America but already serious in some parts of Britain and
Europe, had been detected in Newfoundland. The discovery prompted a flurry of
federal legislation to prevent its spread into Canada. In 1913 powdery scab was
discovered in New Brunswick potatoes bound for Maine, and the Americans
responded with an embargo on all Canadian potatoes. In 1914 Bermuda placed an
embargo on Nova Scotia potatoes, complaining that they were “degenerate” and low
yielding. The embargos were particularly damaging, since they affected Eastern
Canada’s seed-potato export trade, a still-small but lucrative corner of the industry
dominated by well-do-to and politically influential grower-shippers. As a step to
restore confidence in Canadian potato exports, the federal government created a Seed
Potato Certification Service by which, at the request of farmers, federal inspectors
would conduct field inspections to determine if the growers’ fields were disease-free
within accepted parameters. The system was officially begun in New Brunswick in
1918 and, by 1924, was in effect in all Canadian provinces. The chief architects of the
certification system were Hans Güssow (1879-1961), Dominion Botanist, and two of
his very talented lieutenants, Paul A. Murphy and Gilbert C. Cunningham, respective
heads of the plant pathology laboratories in Charlottetown and Fredericton.19
The program of large-scale variety development triggered by this new disease-
consciousness represented a kind of agricultural science at odds with visions of a
democratic science that minimized distinctions of expertise as well as with the theory-
wary vestiges of Baconianism. Potato breeding is a labour-intensive activity involving
extensive record keeping. In addition to technical training, it necessitates horticultural
intuition, gardeners’ craft skills, considerable manipulatory ability and the theoretical
insights of Mendelian genetics. But potato breeding differs from comparable work on
other species because of the widespread infertility problems among tuberosum
varieties and their hybrids and, in the early Fredericton program, by differences in
ploidy (chromosomal number) between S. tuberosum and S. demissum. To counteract
these fertility problems, immature stamens must be removed from the seed parent to
17 Potato Historical Series (1992).
18 It is unclear how early seed export began. The New Brunswick Seed Potato Growers Association was
organized in 1924 and growers shipped some 16 freight cars of seed potatoes to the Atlantic states in
that year. In the 1930s New Brunswick opened up lucrative export markets with Cuba and South
America. See the New Brunswick Department of Agriculture Annual Report, 1924, p. 64 and 1908,
p. 20. See also the Report of the Royal Commission on the New Brunswick Potato Industry
(Fredericton, 1962), pp. 47-50.
19 Ralph H. Estey, Essays on the Early History of Plant Pathology and Mycology in Canada (Montreal
& Kingston, 1994), esp. pp. 42-73, 167-74, 215-20, 306-13; G.C. Ainsworth, Introduction to the
History of Plant Pathology (Cambridge, 1981), esp. pp.186-94; Canadian Food Inspection Agency,
Seed Potato Certification Manual (31 May 2002), ch. 1: “Background and Policy”; M. Chisnall
Hampson, “History, Biology, and Control of Potato Wart Disease in Canada”, Canadian Journal of
Plant Pathology, 15, 4 (December 1993), pp. 223-44.
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prevent the plant from self-pollinating, the plant artificially pollinated with pollen
from the chosen pollen parent, and true seeds collected from the mature seed pod. The
resulting seedlings from the hybrid seed must be grown out, selected over several
years for horticultural characteristics, and finally, when manageable numbers have
been obtained, exposed to a pathogen and evaluated for disease resistance. The most
promising plants are retained for further hybridization, usually backcrossing with an
S. tuberosum line to restore commercial characteristics of tuber size and number while
maintaining the resistance characteristic. So much of S. tuberosum’s cultivated
character is usually lost on the first wild cross that seven or eight generations of
careful backcrossing and screening are required to restore commercial potential.
Moreover, the time required to develop a new variety from first out-cross to
commercial release can be 8 to 15 years. Development work on this scale of
organization and investment, depending as it did upon access to rare Mexican and
South American plants, clearly surpassed the capacity of individual farmers; not even
at the level of rhetoric could it be plausibly assimilated to the ideal of a “democratic”
science, and there were no further attempts to do so.
Still, the break with older ideals and practices was not definitive in the early years
of the breeding program. S. tuberosum is a tetraploid species, meaning that a normal
cell possesses four rather than the usual two sets of chromosomes that constitute the
genome of many other important crop species like maize, barley, rye and rice.
Tetraploidy makes it very difficult to apply Mendelian theory and techniques in order
to deduce the genetic make up of parental varieties or to predict the characteristics of
offspring from sexual crosses of parental varieties, and it increases the range of
variability that offspring are likely to show for particular traits.20 As a consequence,
through the 1930s and 1940s potato breeding retained much of the atheoretical, trial
and error screening focus that had characterized potato science at the Fredericton
station earlier. It was still removed from the “hard” biology and genetics that would
characterize the breeding programme later.
But the early breeding program retained the persistent optimism that nature’s
genetic bounty would ultimately make possible decisive victory over disease.
Scientists at the Fredericton station agreed that the principles of genetics should make
it possible “to solve many if not all of the disease problems of potato growers by
combining resistance with superior qualities of economic importance”.21 Disease-
resistant, freely available public varieties would represent scale-neutral innovations
that would reduce production costs and increase security and self-sufficiency of
farmers large and small. That optimism sustained the programme through the long
years of breeding and screening between 1934 and the programme’s first variety
release in 1950.
20 H.W. Howard, Genetics of the Potato. Solanum tuberosum (London, 1970).
21 H.T. Davies, “Breeding Potatoes for Resistance to Late Blight at the Dominion Experimental Station,
Fredericton, N.B.” (19 January 1950), in “Davies Papers”, p. 6. The claim is quoted from the 1937
U.S. Department of Agriculture Year Book. For similar expressions of optimism concerning viral
diseases, see R.H. Bagnall, “Hypersensitivity, a Form of Resistance to Plant Viruses in Potatoes”,
34th Report of the Quebec Society for the Protection of Plants (1952), pp. 128-31.
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From the Science Service to the Research Branch
Fredericton scientists and administrators were well aware that the potato-breeding
programme affected station life profoundly. The programme competed for resources
with other lines of agricultural research (usually successfully), and for several decades
tended to displace other sorts of potato investigations, such as routine variety tests and
cultural and fertilizer trials. In an unpublished report of 1941, Superintendent C.F.
Bailey noted that experiments of the latter kind had been largely eliminated and
“replaced by projects of a definite research character”. Bailey complained that the
breeding programme was underfunded by Ottawa, that it drained resources from other
work, that it encountered too much interference from supervisory committees outside
Fredericton and that it had a tendency to expand its research agendas beyond the
capacity of the station.22 Nevertheless, Fredericton tenaciously defended its national
monopoly over potato breeding. The station was officially recognized by Ottawa as
the site of the “national” potato-breeding program and, in 1943, over the objections of
other stations across Canada, Fredericton was given the exclusive right to develop
new varieties of potato seedlings, even if those seedlings were to be transferred to
other stations for testing and further development under local conditions. For one
programme, at least, the regional mandate envisioned by the station’s founders had
become a national one.
Like most other forms of agricultural research in Canada, the potato-breeding
programme suffered from severe funding cuts after 1939 and during the Second World
War but went on to a vigorous recovery in the flood of post-war funding to Canada’s
science and scientific institutions. Largely because of the national potato-breeding
programme and its requirements for scientific personnel, the Fredericton station had
emerged by 1960 as Agriculture Canada’s largest and best-financed research
institution after the experimental farm at Lethbridge and the Central Experimental
Farm in Ottawa. Personnel on the experimental farms service side during those years
included horticulturalist Louis C. Young, who had come to the station in 1927; H.T.
Davies, who joined the potato breeding team in 1946; and D.A. Young who, in 1957,
was recruited as the Experimental Farms Service’s first specialized plant geneticist.
L.C. Young and Davies worked with pathologists and virologists of the Science
Service attached to the Plant Pathology Laboratory, notably J.L. Howatt (active at the
station from 1930 to 1959), his superior D.J. MacLeod (1924 to 1960) and Scott F.
Clarkson (1934 to 1945). The pathologists exposed test-seedlings to pathogens and
assessed by visual inspection their degree of resistance. Early on this was done by
mimicking field conditions, for example, growing test-seedlings to maturity in rows
interspersed with diseased plants. Faster screening methods were developed later and
the procedures were moved into the laboratory or the greenhouse. The pathology and
virology group expanded rapidly in the late 1940s and early 1950s. R.H. Bagnall came
in 1946, C.H. Lawrence in 1948, W.A. Hodgson in 1949, J.P. MacKinnon in 1950 and
James Munro in 1951. At the fringes of the breeding programme was Fredericton’s
22 “Horticultural Investigations at the Fredericton Experimental Station”, 28 August 1941 (five-page ms
at the Potato Research Centre library). Superintendent C.F. Bailey’s signature appears on the top of
the first page.
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respected team of aphidologists; key members were Jean Adams, R.H.E. Bradley,
Ellen MacGillivray and Pauline Tompkins.23
Fredericton pathologists and entomologists achieved much in the 1940s and early
1950s, especially in unravelling the role of aphids in transmitting potato diseases and
revealing the nature and complexity of potato viruses. Fredericton horticulturalists
also scored major successes with the release of their first two varieties, Canso and
Keswick, in 1950. But cooperation among these groups of scientists, in Fredericton as
elsewhere, was hampered by administrative structures and competing professional
identities. Before 1937, horticulturalists and plant pathologists worked in different
divisions of the Experimental Farms Branch, and entomologists in an altogether
different branch. After 1937, this administrative separation became even more
pronounced when the latter two groups were reorganized into the new Science
Service. As noted above, the creators of the Science Service wanted a more
theoretical, specialized and professional science that demonstrated a longer-term,
less-immediately-practical orientation toward farmers’ problems. The old
Experimental Farms Branch was the clear loser in this reorganization of 1937,
forfeiting responsibilities, budget and facilities to the new Science Service as well as
a generous measure of prestige. In the succeeding years, employees of the Science
Service, at Fredericton as elsewhere, were more likely to hold degrees in scientific
disciplines rather than in general agronomy, to have obtained a Ph.D. and to have
published in scientific journals than were employees of the Experimental Farms
Service. They also earned higher salaries. The reorganization laid the groundwork for
jealousy and turf wars between researchers in the two services, embodying as they did
not only institutional rivalries but conflicting visions about agricultural science.
At most of Canada’s experimental stations the administrative gap between the two
services produced mutual isolation and lack of communication. Fredericton, however,
was one of a handful of stations where scientists from the two services had to
cooperate on projects like potato variety development that required expertise from
both sides of the house. Even there the cooperation was not without recurrent friction,
both personal and administrative. Plant pathologists found the mass screening of
seedlings required of them for variety development tedious and far removed from
actual research; breeders resented their dependence upon other scientific personnel in
a programme for which they were primarily responsible. The 1941 memo by C.F.
Bailey, cited above, was at pains to convince Ottawa that while the breeding
programme was a cooperative project between the station and the Laboratory of Plant
Pathology, “most of the work” was done by Experimental Farms Service personnel.
The pathologists of the Science Service, Bailey complained, “have been unable to
give us the service we require”. Both claims served Bailey’s plea for more resources
and his clear desire to affirm proprietary rights over the breeding project.
By the 1950s a gradual convergence of professional identity seemed to be
occurring among scientists of the two services. The Science Service began, for
example, to list the scientific publications of its personnel annually in 1947 and to
23 R.G. White, “History of the Fredericton Experimental Station”; I.L. Conners, ed., Plant Pathology in
Canada (Winnipeg, 1972), pp. 45-51. The publications of all station scientists, and sometimes
biographical material, is held in the library of the Potato Research Centre in Fredericton.
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distinguish them from extension and miscellaneous papers; the Experimental Farms
Service followed suit in 1953. T.H. Anstey’s official history suggests that the division
of the two services had begun to seem artificial and anachronistic, and that the
example of integrated research projects like those at Fredericton may have hastened
its end. The new Research Branch, created by Ottawa in 1959 at the instigation of
Kenneth Neatby, administratively combined most facilities and projects of the
Experimental Farms Service with those of the old Science Service. The reorganization
firmly established “research” (no longer “experimentation”) as the mission of the
branch, tacitly excluded regulatory and extension-related functions from the Research
Branch’s mission, introduced the problem-focussed organizational philosophy and, at
least on paper, decentralized control over research priorities from Ottawa to the
various stations and laboratories.24 The old rivalries persisted long after creation of the
Research Branch, but many scientists on both sides of the divide saw the
reorganization as affirming a convergence between the research cultures that was
already well advanced.
The Limits of Resistance Breeding: Late Blight
The 1950s brought Fredericton scientists up against the hard limits set by nature on
the practical efficacy of breeding programmes for disease resistance in potatoes.
Those limits were encountered first in the campaign to develop late blight-resistant
potato varieties. The first breakthrough in this campaign had come in 1913, when
British scientist R.N. Salaman had chanced upon strong late blight resistance in the
wild South American species S. demissum. By the 1930s, S. demissum hybrids were
being used in breeding programmes all over the world, with the Dominion
Experimental Station in Fredericton among the leaders. By the 1940s, potato
geneticists knew that the species possessed as many as four dominant resistance
genes, any one of which on transfer to S. tuberosum would confer virtual immunity
through an intense, hypersensitive reaction. It remained only to make the hybrids, and
by means of time-consuming backcrosses restore the desired commercial and
agronomic qualities. At the end of the 1940s, scientific optimism about ultimate
victory over late blight was strong.
But scientists had not reckoned sufficiently with the genetic variability of
Phytophthora infestans. Fungi occur in particular strains or races that are often
specialized to parasitize particular genotypes of host plant. By the early 1950s seven
such strains of Phytophthora infestans had been isolated in Europe. The existence of
four major resistance genes and multiple strains of the pathogen suggested that an
evolutionary, genetic “race” between host and parasite species was occurring in
accordance with the so-called “gene for gene” theory. Initially, none of this seemed
foreboding. The Scot William Black, then the leading authority in the world, reported
optimistically in the 1950s that each of the major genes conferred resistance to the
24 K.W. Neatby, “Impressions Gained in Course of Visits to U.S. Research Laboratories” and “Report
of . . . Tour of Research Institutions in the United States . . .”, RG 17, vol. 2877, file 12-6-9 (1949),
NA; Anstey, One Hundred Harvests, pp. 65-76, 85-95. Friction between Fredericton scientists and the
Ottawa-based National Potato Breeding Advisory Committee over control of the local breeding
program had been recurrent in the 1940s and 1950s. In the 1960s the Fredericton program seemed to
have gained greater local autonomy vis-à-vis the national committee.
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“common race” of the fungus, and no fungal strain was known that could attack a
potato variety into which all four major genes had been introgressed.25 As late as
1950, no races other than the common race had been identified in Canada.
But the bad news was not long in coming, and scientists at the Fredericton station,
along with Maritime potato farmers, bore the brunt of it. A country-wide sampling of
fungal isolates carried out from Ottawa in 1952-53 by pathologist K.M. Graham, soon
to transfer to Fredericton, identified eight distinct fungal races. Four of them were
isolated from the varieties Canso, Keswick, Kennebec and Placid, all of which were
recent releases (the first two from Fredericton) carrying late blight-resistant genes.26
By 1963 Fredericton pathologists Howatt and Hodgson proved that one fungal isolate
capable of attacking the resistant varieties had become the predominant race in
Eastern Canada on all varieties of potatoes, piggy-backing on the success of the
supposedly-resistant variety Kennebec. With the discovery of sexually-reproducing,
mating groups of the fungus in Mexico, the conclusion seemed inevitable that the
fungus could generate continuous new strains in the presence of resistant varieties.
Resistance breeding using the major genes could keep scientists one step ahead of the
pathogen, but only at the cost of stimulating the rapid development of new, resistant
fungal varieties.
The shock and disappointment of this outcome is palpable in the writings of
Fredericton pathologists like J. Lorne Howatt, and it proved an embarrassing setback
for the station’s resistance-breeding programme. Howatt and others were urging by
1956 that the focus be shifted from the major genes conferring race-specific forms of
resistance to so-called minor genes that conferred an apparently general resistance
effective against all the known races. Being recessive and effective only through the
action of more than one gene, however, the minor genes were far more difficult to
study and transfer in the tetraploid S. tuberosum. The other response was to go beyond
S. demissum to seek new sources of resistance in the many wild, diploid Mexican
species, only a few of which had been studied by the early 1950s. The wild Mexican
diploids are notoriously self-sterile, and the limited fertility of them and their progeny
posed significant problems for crossing with S. tuberosum as well. The attack on these
problems carried breeding work in Fredericton and elsewhere to a new level of genetic
complexity and manipulatory sophistication. It was begun by a younger generation of
biologists and geneticists, including Leo A. Dionne, K. M. Graham, James Munro and
O.T. Page, assisted by new techniques for manipulating ploidy that emerged in the
1950s and early 1960s.
For the potato industry as a whole, this setback shifted efforts toward controlling
late blight through increased reliance on chemical fungicides rather than biology and
25 William Black, “Inheritance of Resistance to Blight (phytophthora infestans) in Potatoes: Inter-
Relations of Genes and Strains”, Proceedings of the Royal Society of Edinburgh, series B, vol. 64
(1952), pp. 312-52; H.H. Flor, “Inheritance of Pathogenicity in Melampsora lini”, Phytopathology, 32
(1942), pp. 653-9; H.H. Flor, “Host-Parasite Interaction in Flax Rust”, Phytopathology, 45 (1954), pp.
680-5; Clayton Person et al., “The Gene-for-Gene Concept”, Nature, 94, 44828 (12 May 1962), pp.
561-3; L.C. Young and H.T. Davies, “The Nature and Inheritance of Resistance to Late Blight
Phytophthora Infestans Mont. De Bary”, a presentation to a seminar group at the Dominion
Experimental Station, Fredericton, N.B. (25 March 1954), “Davies Papers”, pp. 77-88.
26 J.L. Howatt and W.A. Hodgson, “Testing for Late Blight Resistance in the Potato in Canada”,
American Potato Journal, 31, 5 (1954), pp. 129-40.
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genetics. New chemical products emerged to replace the traditional, copper-based
Bordeaux mixture.27 But these were preventive fungicides, which required application
in advance of a suspected infection and were powerless to eradicate an outbreak once
established. How often and how early a grower should spray, therefore, became largely
a function of what expense he could afford and what degree of risk he was prepared to
run. To impose some predictive rationality on this decision-making process, some
station scientists were redeployed to the provincial government’s new late blight-
forecasting programme to develop models for forecasting crop loses and rationalizing
spray schedules.
The real importance of these developments can only be seen in a larger context.
Throughout the 20th century, North American farmers grew steadily more dependent
on off-farm inputs of materials, labour and energy. This process made possible
sustained increases in yields, but it also imposed higher production costs and capital
requirements on farmers. That, in turn, resulted in pressure toward economies of
scale, growing debt loads and a cost-price squeeze that drove many smaller producers
off the land. Potato agriculture in New Brunswick provides a dramatic regional
illustration of this relentless dynamic. Thomas J. Murphy demonstrated that the 1950s
and 1960s were the key decades in a rapid concentration of New Brunswick potato
production onto larger farms located in the “potato belt” counties of Carleton,
Madawaska and Victoria. In 1951 there were 20,004 New Brunswick farms producing
38,123 acres of potatoes; in 1966 there were 5,471 farms producing 65,000 acres.
Over the next 15 years many factors, among them the impact of the mechanical
harvester, would reduce the number of potato farms to 740 and bring about a six-fold
increase in the average number of potato acres per farm.28
This dramatic structural transition was due, in large part, to the growing capital
requirements of competitive potato farming; nature’s refusal to permit the ready
development of truly effective blight-resistant varieties was one factor among the
many that stoked the new capital requirements. In the 1920s best-practice was
recommending four or five fungicide applications per season to New Brunswick
potato farmers; by 1960 the norm on New Brunswick farms was eight to nine
applications, plus top-killing before harvest. Although absolute outlays per acre for
chemical sprays rose dramatically, fungicides’ portion of production costs per acre
actually fell, from about ten per cent in 1925 to less than five per cent in 1960,
confirming growers’ chemical dependency.29 Fungicide-based management practices
controlled late blight effectively and contributed to gradually expanding yields for
farmers who could afford them. They also made potatoes the most chemical intensive
of the major field crops on a per-acre basis, and today a sustainable balance between
genetic resistance and chemical control measures is still being sought.30
27 Ainsworth, History of Plant Pathology, pp. 108-13, 120.
28 Thomas R. Murphy, “The Structural Transformation of New Brunswick Agriculture from 1951 to
1981”, M.A. thesis, University of New Brunswick, 1983, esp. pp. 1-37. See also Darrel A.
McLaughlin, “Beyond the Farm Gate: A Case Study of Constraints and Possibilities as Experienced
by New Brunswick Farm People”, M.A. thesis, University of New Brunswick in Fredericton, 1993.
29 Experimental Station, Fredericton, N.B., Report of the Superintendent . . . for the Year 1925, pp. 28-
35; Royal Commission on the New Brunswick Potato Industry, pp. 92-9, 16-7.
30 On the resistance versus control issue today see G.R. Mackay, “Basic and Applied Reserch Needs for
Sustained Crop Health of the Potato”, American Journal of Potato Research, 77 (2000), pp. 334-8.
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The Limits of Resistance Breeding: Viral Diseases
Even more significant for the industry were the hard realities that awaited scientists
in their struggle with viral diseases. As late as 1920 the exact nature of viral agents
was uncertain and controversial, but that did not prevent plant pathologists from
distinguishing and identifying viruses on the basis of the symptoms they induced in
plants of various species or the means by which they could be transmitted. This was
a labourious, greenhouse-based science that involved transmitting a virus or
combination of viruses through a complex sequence of indicator hosts in order to
isolate and identify it. Nevertheless, between 1920 and 1940 some 17 viral diseases
of the potato, and all the major ones known today, were identified. Scientists learned
that aphids spread some of the most serious potato viruses and that particular
combinations of viruses produce disease symptoms unlike those produced by any
virus alone.31 By the 1940s it was clear that viral infections of potatoes cannot be
wholly prevented under normal field conditions; that virtually the entire crops of most
potato varieties are infected with latent viruses and that viral diseases are a major
limitation on potato production.
But what to do about it? The most direct technological response was to develop
varieties of potato resistant to the various viruses. The Fredericton breeding effort
committed itself strongly to that program, partly because of soaring aphid populations
during the 1940s that made virus infections increasingly common across the province.
The so-called mild mosaic (PVA) and the more serious leaf roll disease, both
transmitted by aphids, received special priority in Fredericton’s early resistance-
breeding program. Around 1950, when it appeared that DDT had effectively
controlled the aphid population and, with it, leaf roll disease, attention shifted to the
viruses A, B and C and especially to the latent virus X. Efforts to breed for virus
resistance further shifted scientific expertise out of the field and into the laboratory as
well as from one set of scientific specialists to another, as serological or grafting tests
replaced visual inspection in screening clonal selections.32
In Fredericton, pathologists Roy Bradley, J.P. Mackinnon and R.H. Bagnall led the
work on potato viruses, aphid-vectors and methods of controlling them, and their
efforts produced significant victories and recurrent frustrations. R.H. Bagnall, for
example, showed that DDT spraying, so effective against resident populations of
aphids that transmitted leaf roll disease, had little effect on the transient populations
of aphids that produced the virus Y. This demonstration, however, did little to blunt
the enthusiasm of producers and extension personnel for DDT and other
insecticides.33 The search for germ plasm on which to base new viral-resistant
cultivars led Fredericton breeders back to old varieties like Irish Cobbler, to newly
developed British and American lines and to Dutch varieties developed from wild
31 D.J. MacLeod, “The Identification of Potato Viruses”, Report of the Quebec Society for the Protection
of Plants, 1952-57, 34 (1958), pp. 87-95; Ainsworth, History of Plant Pathology, pp. 82-6; Sally
Smith Hughes, The Virus: A History of the Concept (London, 1977).
32 L.C. Young and H.T. Davies, “Potato Breeding at the Fredericton Experimental Station”, (seven-page
1951 ms at the Potato Research Centre library).
33 R.H. Bagnall and J.P. MacKinnon, “Count-Down on the Potato Viruses”, Canadian Agriculture
(1962), pp. 8-9.
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South American species, but the work produced mixed results and necessitated
significant tradeoffs. Keswick, released in 1950 as the Fredericton station’s first late
blight-resistant variety, was known at the time of its release to be very susceptible to
virus X.34 Modest successes notwithstanding, the number and diversity of potato
viruses made it unlikely that resistance breeding would be capable of producing
varieties possessing broad resistance against most viral diseases.
The limits on what viral resistance breeding could practicably achieve drove
producers to depend increasingly upon improved phytosanitary measures and more
rigorous certification standards to ensure the maintenance of virus-free stocks. G.C.
Cunningham had been New Brunswick’s early champion of such measures. In the
interest of disease-free stocks, quality maintenance and healthy bottom lines, farmers
were urged to maintain separate seed potato beds, rogue them assiduously, sterilize
instruments and equipment and plant only certified seed. By the 1950s the federal
Seed Potato Certification Service (also headquartered on the Dominion Experimental
Station grounds in Fredericton) was recognizing a small group of elite provincial
growers who alone were entitled to produce and multiply new, relatively clean
foundation seed stock. The Certification Service extended to these growers the
opportunity to have their best selected tubers tested, first against the very serious
bacterial disease ring rot, and then against latent viruses, before being multiplied in
the fields for sale as certified seed stock.
Researchers at the Fredericton station assisted the province in the development of
its phytosanitary system. The station initially provided facilities and expertise for
greenhouse screening of seedlings and tubers in winter grow-outs and, by the 1970s,
was exploring techniques for obtaining disease-free “nuclear” stocks. Virologists
purified viruses and developed sensitive, high-titre antisera to many of them in order
to improve serological tests for infected plants and tubers. Responsibility for the
technical aspects of the phytosanitary system, however, was gradually assumed by the
federal Plant Protection Service and by New Brunswick provincial authorities. In
1966 New Brunswick opened the provincially owned Bon Accord Seed Farm, which
thereafter became the main source of new, “elite” seed for provincial growers.35
The real significance of the phytosanitary system can best be seen from a
comparative and theoretical perspective. As noted, North American agriculture in the
20th century experienced remarkable, sustained increases in yields and productivity,
accompanied by producers’ growing dependence on off-farm inputs of energy,
fertilizers and agrochemicals. This growing dependence has often been taken to
illustrate how scientific research furthers the penetration of capitalist, commodity
production into agriculture, even while the farmer himself remains nominally an
independent, propertied producer. In his 1988 seminal study, Jack Kloppenburg Jr.
extended this analysis, maintaining that, for most major crops, seed had also become
an off-farm input, purchased in the market rather than saved from the previous year’s
crop. This development, he argued, had been brought about through the breeding of
34 Research Report Dominion Research Station (Ottawa:1958-1960, 1961-62, 1963-64).
35 Department of Agriculture of the Province of New Brunswick, Annual Report (1950-1975). In 1975,
for the first time, all seed sold by the provincial seed farm to growers for multiplication was virus-
free.
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hybrid crop varieties, whose seed was high yielding but had to be purchased anew
each year from seed companies. Combined with the extension of Plant Variety
Protection and Plant Patenting acts, this practice was responsible for the
“commodification” of seed and the development of a capitalist seed industry, and
contributed to the growing subjugation of farmers to market forces beyond their
control.36
New Brunswick’s experience with seed potatoes offers a revealing variation on the
Kloppenberg model. Seed potatoes in New Brunswick, as elsewhere, underwent a
commodification, but the resulting seed-supply system was scarcely capitalistic, has
made little use of proprietary varieties to date and owed its origins less to direct
market forces than to government-enforced phytosanitary measures. In New
Brunswick, as in other Canadian provinces, the introduction of the federal Seed Potato
Certification Service was accompanied by provincial legislation making it illegal to
sell non-certified tubers as seed, even though planting non-certified seed saved from
last year’s crop or one’s own seed plot remained a legal, common practice. Federal
standards for certification became increasingly rigorous decade by decade,
progressively narrowing the proportion of growers able or willing to reproduce their
own certified seed and rendering producers who wished to plant certified seed more
dependent upon seed purchases from beyond the farm. In 1970 the federal
government formally introduced the Elite Production System with its “flush through”
provision, by which no potatoes could be qualified for certification at any level if they
were more than five generations removed from uninfected initial stock. Finally, New
Brunswick provincial legislation in 1979 banned the planting of non-certified seed for
any purpose, eliminating the growers’ right to save seed except from inspected and
certified fields.37 At this point “seed” was redefined to mean “government certified
seed” and the commodification process was almost complete.38
Kloppenburg argues that agricultural research contributed to the commodification
of seed in many major crops. This paper suggests that rather the opposite was true for
potatoes – that commodification was a response to the inability of scientific breeding
to produce new varieties that were simultaneously disease resistant and able to
achieve widespread adoption by growers. But scientific research did open up
alternatives to disease resistance by making it possible to produce popular, older
varieties in virus-free forms. The system’s later development, especially its goal of
totally virus-free nuclear stock, depended heavily on research breakthroughs in
36 Jack R. Kloppenburg, Jr., First the Seed. The Political Economy of Plant Biotechnology 1492- 2000
(Cambridge, 1988), pp.1-49. See also Frederick H. Buttel, The Rural Sociology of Advanced
Societies: Critical Perspectives (Montclair, NJ, 1980) and Murphy, Structural Transformation of New
Brunswick Agriculture, pp. 10-37.
37 The key legislation is the federal Seeds Act (and accompanying regulations) and the New Brunswick
Potato Disease Act (1969) as well as the Potato Disease Eradication Act (1979), Revised Statues of
New Brunswick, ch. P-9. See also Canadian Food Inspection Agency, Seed Potato Certification
Manual (May 31, 2002), ch. 1: “Background and Policy” and Scott F. Clarkson and Grace A. Olts,
History of Potato Industry Legislation in New Brunswick: Fifty Years of Progress 1914-1963
(Fredericton, 1963).
38 Full commodification would require patent-protected varieties with further restrictions on the
“farmers’ privilege” of saving seed, a development possibly portended in genetically-modified
varieties.
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detecting viruses and creating virus-free plants through heat treatments and meristem
technology. The phytosanitary system that grew out of these technologies was very
effective in reducing the role for regional potato producers as it represented a
significant regulatory intrusion into the activities of potato farmers; it does not seem,
however, to have been much resisted or resented by New Brunswick growers.39 On
the other hand, the pressure of international competition clearly drew regional
producers into conditions of capitalist dependence, and the phytosanitary system was
developed more as a tool in that competition than in response to disease per se. States
and provinces were all too ready to use disease threats, real or imagined, to block
imports from competitors and to tout the superior cleanliness of their own exports in
foreign markets. In this way, international trade rivalries created strong competitive
pressures toward the development of broadly similar phytosanitary systems,
comparable certification standards that grew ever more rigorous over time and the
similar bodies of technical expertise needed to sustain both.40
Potato Science, the Potato Industry and New Research Directions
While the impact of potato science on long-term structural trends in New
Brunswick farming was profound, research agendas at the station, to a significant
degree, reflected as well as influenced the social and political context of New
Brunswick agriculture during the 1950s and 1960s. In this period, competition
intensified, especially in the lucrative foreign market for seed potatoes, and it brought
new pressure for economies of scale, organization among growers and new, more
efficient marketing mechanisms. These structural changes benefited a few producers,
drove many others out of potato farming altogether and increased levels of farm
debt.41
The emergence of the potato-processing industry was fundamental to this
transition. The three potato chip companies located in New Brunswick since 1945 had
39 But there may have been some resistance. The province’s decision to establish Bon Accord Farm was
motivated partly by the conviction that earlier legislative measures to establish restricted seed stock
areas were proving unenforceable. See Anon. [Scott F. Clarkson?], “Production of Disease-Free
Certified Seed Potatoes”, 1960, Potatoes/potato starch 1960-1965, RS 124, B20a4, PANB. The annual
reports of the Fredericton station show seed amounting to 20 to 25 per cent of total production costs
per acre in the 1920s, the Report of the Royal Commissin on the New Brunswick Potato Industry
showed them at 14 per cent of total production costs in 1959-60 (pp. 100-1) and rough estimates for
the late 1990s suggest 10 to 20 per cent depending on the quality and variety of the seed purchased
and sown.
40 The phytosanitary system and the commodification of seed potatoes may also have been one minor
factor contributing to the fragmented and fractious nature of the potato industry in the Maritimes, a
circumstance that has made it difficult for regional potato growers to organize and cooperate in
protection of their market interests. The system accentuated the differences between seed and other
producers and may have fragmented the seed production sector by creating hierarchies of access to
new elite seed stocks. In turn, the industry may have been left more vulnerable to market forces
beyond the region. On the fragmentation of the potato producers’ community in New Brunswick see
Report of the Royal Commission, pp. 195-204, and government-driven efforts to organize the
producers are chronicled in annual reports of the Department of Agriculture of the Province of New
Brunswick, 1962-1990. For a comparison with the PEI industry, see Report of the Royal Commission
on the Prince Edward Island Potato Industry, vol. 1 (November, 1987), pp. 16-81.
41 Murphy, Structural Transformation of New Brunswick Agriculture, esp. pp. 1-37.
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really generated little demand for tubers, but the opening of the McCain french fry
plant in Florenceville in 1956 changed the face of the industry in the province. In 1956
processing took only 6 per cent of New Brunswick’s total potato production, but by
1961 the proportion was up to 15 per cent and would reach nearly 40 per cent in 1971.
The McCain presence subjected farmers to the enormous market power of a near
monopsony. McCain pursued an active policy of vertical integration and
diversification through subsidiaries, not only selling potato seed, chemicals and
harvesters, but also purchasing farmland, so that by 1976 the company was growing
seven per cent of all New Brunswick potatoes. The firm also introduced contract
growing to New Brunswick, a practice which brought producers some degree of
security in the notorious boom-and-bust potato market, but also subjected their
farming practices to intense external control, since the contacts closely stipulated the
variety and quality of seed to be used and the fertilizer and pesticide schedules to be
observed.42
The 1950s and 1960s also witnessed shifts in provincial and federal government
policy toward farmers. The Agricultural Rehabilitation and Development Act of 1962
and its various federal-provincial successor programmes all sought to promote
economic development in rural areas by linking primary- and secondary-sector
development. For agriculture, this usually meant re-defining farm production as one
link in an extended “agri-food” or “food production” system that would in practice be
dominated by the needs of secondary producers in the interest of value-added
production. Although state initiatives during this period sought to reduce farmers’
risks through programmes of crop insurance, commodity price supports and
marketing boards, these were usually accompanied by insistence on the need to
rationalize and modernize the farm enterprise and sometimes by open hostility toward
small, “inefficient” and under-capitalized operations. Rhetorical defences of the
family farm continued to flourish in government pronouncements, but increasingly
these defences were extended only to family farms deemed viable and rational.43
Nowhere was this philosophy more clearly on display than in the Report of the
Royal Commission on the New Brunswick Potato Industry, commissioned by the
New Brunswick government in 1960. In alarmist tones, the Report concluded that “all
is not well with the New Brunswick potato industry”. Not only had production fallen
behind that of Prince Edward Island, but the Report described the industry as
threatened by a “disastrous complacency” which was leading it to ignore what the
Commission described as a revolution in potato growing going on elsewhere. New
Brunswick’s principal problem, in the view of the Commission, was that “very few
potato acreages . . . are sufficiently large to sustain a reasonable annual return to the
grower”, since to be efficient any producer must have access to “upwards of $20,000
of working capital each season”. Present methods of short-term financing had the
42 Murphy, Structural Transformation of New Brunswick Agriculture, pp. 152-93. Murphy argues that
these developments effectively “proletarianized” potato producers (p. 184), an interpretation
challenged by Kloppenburg and other members of the Cornell group.
43 See Murphy, Structural Transformation of New Brunswick Agriculture, pp. 194-222; Donald J.
Savoie, Regional Economic Development: Canada’s Search for Solutions (Toronto, 1986), pp. 11-32
and (for the modernization ethos at work in another primary resource industry) Miriam Wright, A
Fishery for Modern Times (Don Mills, 2001), pp. 37-61.
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advantage that they “discourage small or inefficient producers” but the disadvantage
that they “undoubtedly prevent the consolidation of larger potato enterprises”. Of the
four areas covered by the Commission’s mandate – research, production, marketing
and processing – the Commissioners insisted that too much energy in the past had
been devoted to research and production concerns, too little to marketing and
processing.44
These developments meant that the Fredericton station was now pursuing its
breeding programme in a different economic and political environment. The growth
of the processing industry accentuated a phenomenon already established in the
tablestock market, namely, the power of large end-use buyers to determine the
varieties that farmers planted. Advanced varieties developed by scientific breeding
faced reduced chances of widespread adoption by farmers, since large buyers had less
to gain from disease-resistant or higher-yielding varieties than direct producers and so
generally preferred established, older varieties despite their known liabilities. On the
basis of its excellent qualities for fry-manufacture and its widespread promotion by
McCain, the old variety Russet Burbank (regionally known as Netted Gems) emerged
from obscurity in the 1950s to become one of the most-planted potato varieties in New
Brunswick by 1975, despite its alleged tendencies to knobbiness, lateness and
relatively high degree of disease susceptibility. On the other hand, new uses for
potatoes and a more differentiated market for tablestock presented challenges to
breeders to create varieties with desirable processing qualities and appeal to specific
markets. In 1962 the Royal Commission took no notice at all of the continuing efforts
of the Fredericton station toward disease resistance. It did, however, praise the
station’s development of varieties introduced during the 1950s as offering New
Brunswick growers the opportunity for market flexibility and rapid adaptation to
niche markets.45
In the new political and commercial climate of the 1950s, calls began for the
Fredericton station’s research to become more practically oriented and market
conscious, usually with the implied criticism that these concerns had been neglected
previously. In 1958 the Canadian Horticultural Council called upon the federal
government to reorient potato research toward product utilization, potato quality and
quality testing, and marketing practices. In 1959 the New Brunswick government
urged the federal government to create a “Potato Research Institute” in Fredericton, a
body that would concentrate on the search for “practical solutions to all important
potato problems”. Harrison McCain, in a letter to the New Brunswick government in
1969, criticized what he considered to be the federal institution’s overcommitment to
pure research on potato problems and urged a turn to practical investigations like
44 Royal Commission on the New Brunswick Potato Industry, pp.1-46.
45 Royal Comission on the New Brunswick Potato Industry, pp. 73-5; Murphy, Structural
Transformation of New Brunswick Agriculture, pp. 99-101.
46 S.F. Clarkson to R.D. Gilbert, May 12, 1958, Plant Protection and Promotion Branch – Corresp.,
1938, 1958, 1960 and 1962, RS 124, F6b, PANB; S.F. Clarkson, “Potato Brief: An Up to Date Potato
Program for the Province of New Brunswick”, October 1958, Plant Protection & Promotion Branch:
Potato-general, 1943, 1956-1960, 1967, RS 124, F6c1, PANB; Harrison H. McCain to Hon. J. Adrien
Levesque, 3 March 1969, Potatoes: McCain, 1964, 1967-71, RS 123, B9F, PANB; Royal Commission
on the New Brunswick Potato Industry, 1962.
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those which, in his view, had produced canola.46
These calls for new research priorities mirrored a redirection of research that was
going on within the Fredericton station itself. During the 1950s the breeding
programme’s objectives were being gradually broadened to include an improvement
of agronomic quality, with new attention to the taste and starchiness of tubers. In 1951
the station opened its first cooking laboratory, under H.T. Davies, to compare the
culinary properties of different varieties. New releases were increasingly targeted to
specific market niches and understood as discreet packages that possessed specific
combinations of agronomic characteristics, management requirements and disease
resistances and susceptibilities. These included the development of netted-skin
varieties for Western Canada, purple-skinned and wart-resistant varieties for
Newfoundland and red-skinned types for certain export markets. But local needs also
figured heavily in the station’s research agenda. By the mid-1950s Fredericton
breeders had begun to focus on the needs of the newly emerging chipping industry;
by the late 1950s they had begun to address what provincial politicians hoped would
be a New Brunswick potato starch industry; and by the early 1960s they had launched
variety development for the french fry industry. External calls for a more practically
oriented and market-conscious research agenda therefore mirrored, and on occasion
may have appeared at the instigation of, like-minded elements within the station itself.
This broadening of breeding objectives was tacitly premised on the assumption that
disease resistance alone would not ensure a new variety’s adoption by growers. Some
Fredericton scientists who had spent their careers in the development of disease
resistance found this outcome unexpected and frustrating. In 1954 virologist James
Munro acknowledged with some annoyance that growers were often prepared to
ignore or tolerate virus infections, and that they were not much interested in new,
resistant varieties that would displace their familiar and commercially proven
cultivars. Given this frustrating frame-of-mind among growers, he wrote, there was
no other course open to scientists than to “clean up” the traditional varieties and make
sure that they were available in virus-free forms. As for variety-development work,
scientists would have to face the hard fact that resistance would take second place to
agronomic qualities if new varieties were to attract support.47
Despite the agreement that agronomic improvement and disease resistance must
now coexist as development objectives, achieving the proper balance between these
goals seems to have created continued friction among station scientists. In particular,
it seems to have pitted potato breeders, who championed an expansion of breeding
objectives, against cooperating pathologists, who felt that the long-term potential for
genetically-resistant varieties was being prematurely discounted in the process. In this
way, friction within the breeding programme continued to reflect the older alignments
between scientists of the Experimental Farms Service and those of the Science
Service. Disagreement expressed itself less in formal debates over priorities and
policies than in the hundreds of small, recurrent screening decisions – at that time
made collectively by breeders, pathologists and entomologists – about whether the
47 James Munro, “Maintenance of Virus-Free Potatoes”, American Potato Journal, 31, 3 (March 1954),
pp. 73-82; James Munro, “The Importance of PVX”, American Potato Journal, 38, 12 (December
1961), pp. 440-7.
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characteristics of a particular seedling qualified it for further testing, backcrossing and
observation, resulting in either multiplication or elimination.
By 1965 retirements, resignations and transfers had depleted the ranks of the
station’s pathologists and breeders, and with a major turnover of scientific personnel
pending, the station undertook a review of its potato-breeding programme, and its
objectives. Some decisions taken after the review formalized or consolidated new
directions already in place: to further exploit new germ plasm sources from the wild
and cultivated diploid species and the tetraploid andigena subspecies; to hire new
personnel skilled in the utilization of these genetic resources; to expand breeding
objectives to meet the needs of the processing industries; and to recognize that
successful new varieties must combine agronomic characteristics and disease
resistance in combinations tailored to particular markets. The most controversial
decision reached in the review was to reduce the size of the breeding programme’s
local steering and evaluation committee and restrict it primarily to breeders. This step
essentially transferred authority away from the collectivity of scientists cooperating
with the potato-breeding programme to lodge it with the breeders themselves. A
decision was also reached to appoint a pathologist directly to the potato-breeding
section to take over the routine screening entailed by the work.
Collectively these decisions of the mid-1960s ratified a shift in program
philosophy as fundamental as that which had marked the launch of the breeding
programme in 1934. In the process, however, little had to be abandoned or sacrificed.
The infusion of money into Canada’s public research capacity that began in the 1950s
made it possible for public-sector agricultural scientists to expand their research
agendas on all these fronts. By 1970 the station’s potato research was broader and
more diverse than it had ever been, embracing variety development, plant physiology,
plant pathology and disease control, and cultivation and management studies.
But in the process the station and its research programs had changed. After 1959,
as had been intended by Neatby in his creation of the Research Branch of Agriculture
Canada, the investigations carried out by the Fredericton station became increasingly
specialized, technical and intensive. Station scientists were increasingly prepared to
describe their work using interventionist and engineering metaphors foreign to the
scientific prose of the earlier part of the century. Louis C. Young, head of the breeding
project, noted as early as 1958 that the trial-and-error methods of previous decades
had given way to “advanced scientific approaches” that probed causal mechanisms as
well as phenomenal effects. By 1973 his successor, D.A. Young, was prepared to
describe his team’s work as “trying to rebuild a species”.48
With that gradual change in research style, the role of the station in New
Brunswick’s agricultural community was also altered. By the 1950s the responsibility
for farm extension work was being increasingly assumed by the New Brunswick
provincial government or other federal agencies. The station closed its network of
illustration stations in 1956; production economics mostly disappeared from the
station’s bulletins and annual reports; field days and open houses declined in
attendance and significance; and research specialization gradually replaced the
station’s original mixed-farming focus.
48 Maritime Farmer and Cooperative Dairyman, 2 September 1958, p. 3; 6 February 1973, p. 12.
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Conclusion: Potato Science, Potato Agriculture and Two Theoretical Problems
This study of agricultural science in one regional centre sheds light on two
theoretical disputes within the social studies of science. One of those disputes has
focussed on “social constructivist” interpretations of scientific change. Social
constructivist accounts privilege institutional context, the interpersonal dynamics of
the research community and the influence of the larger socio-political milieu as causal
factors of scientific developments. In doing so they have provoked bitter protests that
“nature”, in the sense of objective empirical discoveries, has been abandoned as an
explanatory determinant of scientific change.
This story of potato resistance breeding shows how both sorts of factors – nature and
society – were inextricably bound together. On the one hand, the evolution of potato
research in Fredericton demonstrates how viruses and fungi frustrated the earlier,
optimistic hope that resistance breeding would provide universally accessible, relatively
cost-free solutions to the farmers’ need for disease control in potatoes. Nature’s frustration
of that research agenda helped turn the industry toward different solutions and different
types of scientific expertise, including increased reliance on fungicides and the
construction of a state-enforced phytosanitary system. Those new solutions contributed in
distinct if limited ways to a much larger structural transformation of potato farming and
the potato industry, which was widespread in the region during the period 1950 to 1970.
On the other hand, this story has also shown that beyond factors related to viruses and
fungi, scientists, civil servants, Royal Commissioners, entrepreneurs, economists and
politicians worked to promote new research agendas for potato science and potato
breeding. The kinds of social factors that shaped these scientific outcomes were partly
institutional and professional, but they were also partly economic and political. The waves
of rationalization and consolidation that swept through regional agriculture in the 1950s
and 1960s not only brought deep structural change to the potato industry, but also exerted
powerful pressures to refocus the agenda of scientific agriculture from the exclusive needs
of producers to the needs of the industry.
A second theoretical issue of interest to the social studies of science concerns the interpretive
gap that often seems to loom between the supposed universality of scientific knowledge claims
and the ineluctably local and particularistic contexts in which that knowledge is produced and
subsequently shaped. This study both illustrates that tension and in part dissolves it. The scientific
developments traced here at the Dominion Experimental Station in Fredericton closely parallelled
those going on in other research facilities and breeding programmes across North America and
Europe at the same time, just as the structural transformation of the New Brunswick potato
industry broadly mirrored similar developments elsewhere in the region and in other potato-
producing areas of North America. Despite its national mandate and the trans-regional nature of
its breeding programme, however, provincial and regional needs and pressures acted strongly
upon the Fredericton station and its personnel throughout its history. Station scientists interacted
with regional producers, processors and provincial officials in setting breeding objectives and in
devising strategies against disease; at the same time, from the initiation of the breeding programme
in the 1930s to the broadening of its objectives in the 1950s and 1960s, regional needs and
pressures mediated indispensably between local programmes and international developments in
potato science. In the potato-breeding programmes of the Fredericton station, there was no conflict
between the supposed universalism of science and the specifically regional and provincial context
in which it was pursued.
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